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Anthropology as a Following Science 
Humanity and Sociality in Continuous Variation 
Casper Bruun Jensen 
IT University of Copenhagen 
Introduction 
The vantage point of this paper will be to view anthropology through the lens 
provided by G. Deleuze and F. Guattari’s notion of following sciences (1987: 
372–3). Contrasting following sciences with what they called the reproductive 
sciences, Deleuze and Guattari defined the former as concerned with singularities 
and continuous variation rather than law-like regularities. Characteristically, these 
authors do not refer to social sciences in their discussion of these two models, and 
their definition remains extremely abstract. However, the suggestion that 
following sciences are itinerant and ambulant, concerned with “following a flow 
in a vectorial field across which singularities are scattered like so many ‘accidents’ 
(problems)” (372) can be seen as a description of the ethnographer’s predicament. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that from the point of view of the science and technology 
studies (STS) and the anthropology of science and technology, the designation 
‘following science’ connects almost literally with the Latourian dictum of 
‘following actors’ (Latour 1987). In this light STS might be characterized as the 
following science dedicated to following science (and technology). Designating 
anthropology broadly as a following science has the additional appeal of tying in 
with disciplinary interests in elucidating indigenous concepts, structures, world-
views, and cosmologies from within rather than classifying and evaluating them 
from without. 
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If one takes literally the Deleuzian notion of following sciences, it may 
seem as if STS and social anthropology already, or perhaps automatically, qualifies. 
As following rather than reproducing sciences STS and the newer philosophies of 
science can be characterized as having taken a ‘practice-turn’ (Schatzki et al 2001). 
This was vigorously outlined in A. Pickering’s landmark edition Science as 
Practice and Culture (1992). Proponents of the practice-turn argued that 
philosophers of science and technology had failed to adequately describe science 
and technology because they were too focused on delineating scientific method and 
defining science conceptually, rather than on following science in order to explore 
how scientists actually work. In numerous contributions, STS researchers have 
shown that actual scientists were by no means solely preoccupied with theory, 
concepts, or, indeed, truth (cf. Biagioli 1999). Rather they spent their time gathering 
resources, laboriously tinkering with laboratory set-ups, enrolling evermore natural 
and technical entities, carefully working on the rhetoric of their articles, and 
viciously fighting with other colleagues. 
Devoting their efforts to the naturalistic study of all that scientists did, the 
early laboratory studies approached science with a basically etic stance (e.g. 
Latour & Woolgar 1979). Scientific systems, networks and so forth were 
described from the outside. This characterization may seem peculiar since one of 
the traits distinguishing laboratory studies from the philosophy of science was 
precisely that it moved inside laboratories, rather than defining epistemological 
principles in the abstract. Yet, even as B. Latour and S. Woolgar entered the 
laboratory, they did not do so in order to elucidate the self-understandings and 
motivations of the scientists working there. On the contrary, they deliberately 
remained ‘strangers’. The result was that they could re-describe what scientists 
viewed as a search for facts and truth as a practical matter of producing 
inscriptions. As we know, one consequence of applying this outsider’s perspective 
on scientific activity was to anger a good many scientists, as became vivid in 
some of the science wars exchanges (Smith 1997). 
However, within the field of STS the outsider’s stance also gradually caused 
trouble. A critical question often raised by anthropologists was whether naturalistic 
description of scientific activities had certain built-in limitations. By declining to 
query the quality of scientific concepts as concepts, STS scholars were prevented 
from coming to grips with the question of what makes science meaningful, 
important, lively, and exciting to scientists (Stengers 2011)1. Indeed, inattentiveness 
                                                           
1
 Much of the following argument is inspired by arguments that unfolded during the 
"Comparative Relativism" symposium, published subsequently as a special issue of 
Common Knowledge 17(1). The quotations are from the original papers and do not 
completely match the published versions, however, references are made to the 
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to this issue could be viewed as preventing STS researchers from elucidating the 
many varied ontologies of science and also impeding their ability to understand the 
politics of science that was built into their concepts (Bowker 2010). 
This critical observation about the limitations of laboratory studies did not 
involve a rejection of the ‘practice-turn’; it should certainly not be seen as a 
demand to return to previous modes of epistemological clarification. Rather, it 
suggested that when one delves deeper into practice it becomes impossible to stay 
clear of the ways in which any practical activity is conceptually enmeshed. 
Here, as well, a connection can be made with the previously mentioned 
notion of following sciences. For Deleuze and Guattari, too, ‘following’ must 
mean something rather different than simply ‘walking after’, observing all there is 
to see, describing what is really going on. For, if following is an entailment of 
being able to learn something from what one studies, its requirements are by no 
means simple. Indeed, it always raises specific questions regarding ‘how to follow 
creatively’ in order to be able to discern singular problems raised by practices 
rather than describe what is generic about them. This requirement also entails that 
questions relating to the connection between the ‘conceptual’ and the ‘empirical’ 
are opened up anew. 
This in a double sense: for, in the first instance, there is the question of the 
characteristics and operations of the concepts used by the actors followed. Then, 
subsequently, there is the issue of the concepts used by the anthropologist or STS 
scholar to make sense of the specific practical-conceptual constellation that 
comprises their matter of concern. In the present context, this matter of concern 
can be broadly characterized as having to do with the sorts of humanity and 
sociality embodied in those practices, and how our ways of studying are able to 
articulate them. 
The question of how to relate the conceptual and the empirical has also 
been long-standing one in anthropology proper. While it is impossible to go into 
details, it can be suggested that a key moment occurred with M. Strathern’s 
(1988) The Gender of the Gift, which argued simultaneously against defining 
Melanesian concerns in terms of Western typologies (e.g., of gender and 
commodification) and against simply replacing those typologies with indigenous 
categorizations. Widely different interpretations have been offered as to the 
implications of this double requirement; just as multiple fascinating studies have 
followed in its wake (e.g. Holbraad 2008; Maurer 2005; Zhan 2009). 
Viewing anthropology as a following science that uses ethnography as a 
creative method (or technology) for following offers some particular benefits. In 
                                                                                                                                                               
published articles. 
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our case it allows, first of all, for the suspension of common-sense ideas of what 
the human and the social consists of. The benefit of this suspension is that it 
enables the researcher to follow creatively, and facilitates him or her to learn from 
the diverse actors followed, the specific shape they give to what we normally 
designate as human and social. 
Here we are firmly back on the territory of both STS and anthropology. Of 
particular interest for the present occasion is the work of A. Mol. Her analytical 
aspiration, not least inspired by actor-network theory (ANT) (Law & Hassard 
1999; Law & Mol 2002), very much follows this line of thinking: she has named 
the endeavor empirical philosophy. 
Now of course if one is interested in learning from actors how they deal 
with what we usually call the human and the social, this includes the possibility 
that nothing resembling either the human or the social, as generically understood, 
is dealt with. In these cases, the intriguing question of what different actors take 
the world to be composed of if not humans and society is opened. This analytical 
agenda has been sharpened by social anthropologists M. Strathern (1988) and R. 
Wagner (1975). For the present purposes I pinpoint it with E. Viveiros de Castro’s 
term “multinaturalism” (2005).  
The choice of exemplars invoked here is not accidental. The scholars 
referred to above have all played central roles in redefining not only conceptual 
concerns in their fields, but also the relation between the conceptual and the 
empirical more generally. In doing so, they have opened up new ways of coming 
to terms with the variability of humanity and sociality. But in spite of important 
resonances, empirical philosophy (and its kin ANT) and the social anthropological 
studies that I classify here under the general heading multinatural anthropology 
have not done so in identical ways. Teasing out some of central differences is the 
main ambition of this paper. 
Below, a series of ‘variations’ engage with the question of how empirical 
philosophy and multinatural philosophy engage with issues such as methods, 
actors, scales, practices, concepts, and ontologies. These variations aim to 
highlight that despite of their affinities, these approaches have different analytical 
and empirical focal points. Making use of different conceptual–empirical 
constellations, the approaches make available alternative routes that may be taken 
in order to understand ‘the human’, ‘the social’, and their interconnections. By 
adopting a strategy of continuous variations, I thus aim to maximize the ability of 
ANT and empirical philosophy to exhibit its contrasts with multinatural 
anthropology, and vice versa. 
This has implications for how I proceed. Most importantly, it means that I 
attend to a particular set of programmatic arguments from empirical philosophy that 
 C. Jensen. Anthropology as a Following Science 
5 
NatureCulture 2012 
Copyright owned by the authors 
precisely highlights its distinctiveness from anthropology. Likewise, I focus on 
analytical suggestions from multinatural anthropology that put it most starkly at 
odds with STS scholarship. Although it would certainly be possible (and sensible) 
to offer readings that concentrate on resonances and similarities, the present aim is 
to use these differences and contrasts methodically, to diagnostic effect. 
With this in mind, the rest of the paper aims to engage in its own exercise of 
‘continuous variation’ by teasing out distinctions and relations between empirical 
philosophy and multinatural anthropology. The variations take their starting point in 
the classical dichotomy between emic insider studies, and etic outsider studies. As a 
first estimation, multinatural anthropology could be seen to exemplify the emic, 
ANT and empirical philosophy the etic. What the first variation suggests, however, 
is that the emic–etic distinction is never clearcut, is always ambiguous and blurred. 
It is, in fact, in part due to this realization that modes of symmetrical inquiry and 
exposition have been developed in both STS and anthropology. The following 
variations explore in more detail the varied symmetrical solutions provided by 
empirical philosophy and multinatural anthropology. There are of consequences for 
how anthropologists bring humanity, sociality, or their alters into view, and for 
what follows, analytically and practically. 
First Variation: Emic, Etic, Symmetric 
According to a classic linguistic formulation (Pike 1967), the terms etic and emic 
distinguish modes of accounting for, describing, explaining, and interpreting 
events and occurrences. In the hands of anthropologists the distinction came to 
refer to the difference between insider (emic) and outsider (etic) descriptions of 
culture. Anthropologists, of course, were outsiders, but many came to define their 
task as elucidating insider conceptions. In the two cultures optic proposed by C. P. 
Snow (1993), this aligned with a more broadly humanistic perspective and 
contrasted with an impartial approach said to characterize the natural sciences. 
Thus differentiated, emic approaches, often including social anthropology, 
take a participant’s perspective in order to study purposive meaningful action and 
to gain critical insight (Smith 2005: 110). Etic approaches, in contradistinction, are 
said to take an observer’s perspective, in which intention and meaning is less 
central, or not central at all (after all, natural phenomena, one is told in methods 
courses, do not interpret). If the aim of emic approaches is to interpret and 
understand, the aim of etic approaches is to reduce, quantify and model. This dualist 
depiction is well known. It might perhaps be easy to agree that anthropology—at 
least cultural and social—belongs to the side of the emic. Yet, the relation between 
the emic and the etic often blurs, as the following story illustrates. 
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In her recent book Natural Reflections (Smith 2010: 2–5), B. H. Smith 
explains how, in the early 1950s, Marion Keech, resident of a town in the U.S. 
Midwest, called on newspapers to let them know of a coming flood. It was going 
to be the first in a series of catastrophic events, leading to eventual worldwide 
cataclysm. Keech had been told about these forthcoming occurrences by aliens 
through the medium of automated writing. Along with a small set of devotees, she 
prepared herself in the countryside of Minnesota. Now, shortly after having made 
her knowledge public, Keech got five additional followers. At least this was what 
they claimed to be. Who were these newcomers? Neither anthropologists, nor 
secret agents, they were a group of psychologists. Alerted to the existence of the 
millenarians through newspaper reports, they had decided to conduct a “field test”, 
a natural experiment to test their psychological theory. This theory had to do with 
the tendency of people to remain convinced of their prior beliefs in spite of 
disconfirming evidence. When the flood failed to materialize, the psychologists 
did indeed get their hands on a body of evidence that bore on the matter. 
Conceived as a field test, the set-up I have just described was clearly etic. 
The purpose was to apply an outsider’s neutral perspective. It was to conduct a 
naturalistic study of an empirical phenomenon about which psychologists had so 
far only been able to obtain archival evidence. Although they went to live with the 
millenarians, the psychologists were not at all into understanding the meanings or 
social contexts. At the same time, however, the actual form of engagement can be 
characterized as a kind of covert ‘participant observation’. Thus, although the 
psychologists’ ambition was etic, their mode of operation defied the traditional 
requirements of detached objectivity. Indeed, they attempted to establish 
detachment by pretending to go native. 
From the present vantage point, we are of course likely to view the 
procedure as ethically problematic. More importantly for our purposes, however, 
methodological difficulties also ensued, since the psychologists’ method was 
precisely neither outsider nor insider. Instead it thoroughly mixed up etic and 
emic “genres” of inquiry. And indeed this mixture created the specific 
opportunities and problems for their research into the psychological make-up—
the humanity—of their subjects. 
This methodological mixture was not due to any deep reflexive 
consideration. Indeed, it happened quite in spite of the etic–objectivist ambition of 
the psychologists. The contrast to contemporary STS and social anthropology is 
thus striking, since these fields have paid sustained and explicit attention to their 
respective processes of making knowledge. In STS, a particularly important 
methodological reorientation goes under the name of symmetry (Bloor 1976; 
Latour 1993). In its basic form symmetry means that the same form of 
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explanatory causes should be adopted to account for both what is viewed as 
rational and irrational behavior, the same type of general explanation, that is, for 
both millenarian “irrationality” and scientific “rationality”. 
B. H. Smith’s comments on the case just described are symmetrical in this 
sense. She suggests that the millenarians’ behavior after the non-occurrence of the 
flood certainly did exemplify the psychologists’ thesis (on the persistence of belief 
in the face of disconfirmation). However, Smith notes in addition that several of the 
scientists’ predictions failed to come through: for example, several millenarians did 
abandon their convictions. Nevertheless, just as many millenarians were capable of 
offering creative accounts for why catastrophe had not occurred, the scientists, too 
“exhibited considerable resourcefulness in explaining the relevant disparities 
between expectations and experience” (Smith 2010: 4). 
In fact, the theory tested by the psychologists later became famous under 
the name “cognitive dissonance”. Nevertheless, what Smith’s analysis shows is 
that it simultaneously worked and did not quite work, and this both in the case of 
the millenarians and in the case of the psychologists aiming through that very 
study to validate it. 
Smith hands us the tools to deconstruct this theory: she indicates both 
methodological and reflexive problems. And yet, she suggests, dismissal would be 
an inadequate response. For deconstruction offers no assistance if we want to 
account for the fact that the theory of cognitive dissonance nevertheless “remains 
one of the most firmly established, highly respected, and intellectually fertile 
theories in the history of social psychology” (4). In an additional twist, it is a 
theory that Smith herself makes inspired (and reflexive) use of. 
The latter point is important because it puts Smith’s symmetry in a 
particular light. Indeed, she uses the parable of the millenarians to make new 
points about precisely the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. Which is to say 
that she is on the psychologists’ side as regards the aim of their study. From an 
anthropological point of view, however, we may add additional queries. Whereas 
Smith’s symmetry is used to argue that at a certain level (namely, the level of 
human cognition), the millenarians and the psychologists are engaging in the 
same kinds of processes, we might want to pause to consider in more detail the 
distinct and specific social practices and conceptualizations of the millenarians. 
Possibly this might include paying close attention to their interpretations of the 
scientific findings that they involuntarily helped to give birth to. 
Adding to the inquiry, we would likely find that at other levels (than 
general human cognition) the differences between millenarians and psychologists 
were at least as consequential as their similarities. Quite possibly we would find 
that the kinds “humanity” and “sociality” that they engaged in and aspired to 
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exhibited quite radical differences. One significant benefit of adding this level of 
symmetry to the analysis would be that it ensured that “cognitive inventiveness” 
would not be the sole prerogative of the scientists. Inventiveness might also be an 
integral dimension of millenarian practice; it might reside, for example, in the 
material and social practices in which they engage. Explicating this possibility 
requires another analytical stance; one provided by empirical philosophy. 
Second Variation: Empirical Philosophy (against Perspectivalism) 
Anthropologists interested in native knowledge, may ask the people they 
study what they think. And hope to hear interpretations of reality. But 
anthropologists may also try to investigate what people do. Ask them 
about, and observe, their activities. The latter method makes it possible 
for researchers to reconstruct the world not through a grid of attributed 
meanings, but through a series of interventions carried out—which 
allows them to talk about the realities that are performed (Mol 1998: 145). 
The opening quotation provides a programmatic statement on how empirical 
philosophy differs from ethnography. Now, the description of ethnography as 
facing a choice between engaging interpretations or practical activities may strike 
anthropologists as peculiar. Ethnographers characteristically deal with both, 
simultaneously. Is there any reason for requiring a principled decision to prefer 
one or the other? In reality, of course, people do act and do interpret. If Mol’s 
characterization has an important programmatic function it is because it aims to 
specify an approach to the study of actions and relations that is not emic and 
human-centered and not, therefore, anthropological as classically conceived. This 
is what she calls empirical philosophy. More concerned with what people do than 
what they think, the approach appears etic in aspiration. Of course, the situation 
turns out more ambiguously in the end. 
Now, in The Body Multiple empirical philosophy is specified as follows:  
It is possible to refrain from understanding objects as the central points 
of focus of different people’s perspectives. It is possible to understand 
them instead as things manipulated in practice. If we do this—if instead 
of bracketing the practices in which objects are handled we foreground 
them—this has far-reaching effects. Reality multiplies (Mol 2002: 4–5). 
Reality multiplies, what could this mean? Modern philosophy has focused 
resolutely on epistemological questions: that is, questions about how the world 
can be known. With the suggestion that, by focusing on the manipulation of 
objects and practices, reality multiplies, the focus moves to questions of ontology: 
what the world is and how it changes. The term ‘empirical philosophy’ plays on 
this change in register. Practically, it requires the combination of conceptual 
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interests from the philosophy of knowledge with “ethnographic interests in 
knowledge practices” (5) (and cf. Jensen & Gad 2008).  
But what does it mean to claim to take an interest in how the world is, or 
becomes? Philosophy since Kant has repeatedly made the argument that this is 
precisely what cannot be queried: we cannot engage the world freed from our own 
concepts. Indeed, most anthropologists would agree. The standard story might go 
like this: people interpret the world in numerous ways, and anthropologists 
interpret their interpretations in yet more ways. Nevertheless the world underlying 
the interpretations is real. It is just that it is inaccessible, hard to come by. Except 
perhaps by natural scientists. 
By accepting this division of labor—reality (hard to come by) for the 
natural scientists, and meanings (overflowing from everywhere) for the social 
scientist—qualitative sociologists and anthropologists have participated in what A. 
N. Whitehead (1929) called the “bifurcation of nature”. Consider the case of 
medical sociology, a field with which Mol is in discussion. In a first move, this 
field defined a social realm of illness as opposed to a medical realm of the disease. 
As interpretive approaches gained in strength, disease itself came to be seen as a 
simply a perspective held certain powerful social actors, such as doctors. But, Mol 
suggests, covered over by increasing numbers of possible perspectives, the world 
and its bodies disappeared. This is why, as a following science, anthropology 
should not take as its aim the emic elucidation of yet more perspectives, meanings 
and interpretations. They are rather part of a problem: 
For by entering the realm of meaning, the body’s physical reality is still 
left out […] But the problem has grown: this time the body isn’t only 
unmarked in the social sciences, but in the entire world they evoke […] In 
a world of meaning, nobody is in touch with the reality of diseases, 
everybody ‘merely’ interpret them […] The disease recedes behind the 
interpretations (Mol 2002: 11–12). 
In “perspectival tales”, Mol says, the body “stays untouched”: indeed, “this is 
built into the very metaphor of ‘perspectives’ itself” (12). In contrast, empirical 
philosophy is given the task of getting the world into view again. It does so by 
attending in painstaking detail to the ways in which objects, of disease, for 
example, are in practice dealt with, in different ways. Reality thus multiplies: a 
disease such as atherosclerosis is not singular but multiple and this is because it is 
enacted and performed differently in different care practices. It is manipulated in 
different ways: it is made to do different things. Atherosclerosis, for example, 
exhibits the multiplicity of reality: it may be all of: “claudication, thickening of 
the intima, loss of lumen, pressure drop, plaque formation” (Mol 1998: 161)—in 
 C. Jensen. Anthropology as a Following Science 
10 
NatureCulture 2012 
Copyright owned by the authors 
different times and places. Each of these distinguishing traits involves different 
materials, practices, and people who perform, manipulate, and alter reality. 
Consequently, the different versions of the disease are precisely not 
perspectives, but they are not naturalized in the body of the patient either. Rather 
they are a “function of a wide range of habits and materials. Forms, knives, pain, 
hands, gloves, telephones, slides, what have you. Links of many natures. 
Heterogeneous links” (Mol 1998: 148). If eliciting the multiplicity of reality is a 
defining feature of empirical philosophy, it has to do with the specification and 
articulation of these links, since reality is literally performed through them. They 
are not perspectives, because it is not a matter of looking deeper or elsewhere in 
order to find others: there is no deeper reality lying under specific performances. 
Ontology is thus practically enacted: they can therefore be followed in practice 
(Jensen 2004). And empirical philosophy as a following science is one that 
follows the links that make up reality—and thus enact very different ways of 
doing sociality and humanity. 
At this point, the characterization of empirical philosophy as etic is 
rendered ambiguous. Since the approach eschews any prior categorization of what 
can qualify as a relation, the “social” or “human” may inhere in scalpels and blood 
vessels; but “natural” relations may likewise be performed in conversations 
between doctors and patients. Indeed, the heterogeneous links that make up 
practice thus include interpretations, at least those offered to the empirical 
philosopher as articulations of what the relevant activities consist of. This is one 
reason why we can talk of the approach as symmetrical. 
However, even if the emic–etic distinction is ambiguous, it still helps 
make vivid where the symmetry of empirical philosophy wavers. For although 
relevant links must be traced and delineated, a preliminary decision has been 
made to center focus on “what people do” (including what they say about what 
they do), rather than “what they think” in more generic terms. And even though 
this decision is related to the programmatic reorientation from epistemology to 
ontology, it does introduce an asymmetry. For what if people insist that their 
thinking is as important as their manipulations. Or, what if they are co-
constitutive? As in the previously encountered criticism of the naturalistic 
tradition in STS, the question arises whether empirical philosophy becomes 
unnecessarily delimited if it takes the decision to withhold interest from “thinking” 
at face value. 
Indeed, it could be argued that by focusing much more attentively on 
actors’ conceptualizations, more might be learned as well about the multiplicity of 
ontologies. After all, it would be a shame to bifurcate nature in reverse by making 
part of the world everything except how we conceive of it. 
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Third Variation: Multinaturalism as Perspectivism 
The Amerindian-derived conceit of “perspectival multinaturalism” 
emerged precisely as a result of an attempt to compare comparisons—
that is, to contrast anthropological and indigenous modes of perceiving 
analogies between domains—and to trace a line of flight past the poles 
of the infernal dichotomies that form the bars of our metaphysical cage: 
unity and multiplicity, universalism and relativism, representation and 
reality, nature and culture, to name but a few (Viveiros de Castro 2011). 
I have suggested that empirical philosophy—at least in its programmatic 
formulations—come across as etic but, nevertheless, incoporates the emic (even if 
somewhat half-heartedly). Yet, while empirical philosophy has aimed to find a 
way out of ‘perspectivalism’ by attending to practices, some anthropologists, 
prominently M. Strathern and R. Wagner, defined another analytical ambition: 
one whose purpose was to move anthropology away from a too literal concern 
with practices, towards an interest in dealing more seriously with indigenous 
conceptualization. E. Viveiros de Castro (1998) and T. S. Lima’s (1999) notion of 
multinaturalism is one result of this effort; their delineation of Amerindian 
perspectivism is another. 
Even as both empirical philosophy and multinatural anthropology entail 
the undoing of central Western epistemological dualisms, such as mind–body, 
representation–reality, theory–practice, they come to this task via different routes. 
While empirical philosophy aims to tune in to the ways in which realities are 
performed in practice, and therefore engages “indigenous conceptualizations” 
primarily as verbalizations of concrete practices, multinatural anthropology takes 
as its starting point the “ontological presuppositions” that inform the ways in 
which indigenous people act. The reason that Amerindians act differently from the 
Danes, Dutch, Japanese, or Vietnamese has to do both with their tools and 
practices and also with their vastly different concepts of bodies (human, animal, 
technological or spiritual), and also of their equally different ideas of what we 
tend to call “the cultural”, “the social”, “the political”, and so on (Viveiros de 
Castro 2009: 247). 
Indeed, as suggested in Viveiros de Castro’s opening citation, these 
differences extend to the question of whether any such categories have any 
purchase at all, and thus to the issue of comparison as such, as a variably 
configured form. This is why Viveiros de Castro identifies the interest in 
“comparing comparisons” as central. Comparison, of course, is also central to 
empirical philosophy. In the previously invoked example, Mol used comparison to 
evoke how different versions of disease were brought into reality, aligned, 
opposed or contrasted through a variety of practical regimes. Obviously, therefore, 
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the point is not to establish a clear-cut opposition between empirical philosophy 
and multinaturalism. Just as obviously, however, they are not the same. 
Viveiros de Castro is fond of quoting R. Wagner’s statement that in his 
engagement with the Daribi, “their misunderstanding of me was not the same as 
my misunderstanding of them” (Wagner 1975: 20). The notion of “comparing 
comparisons” pinpoints that this mutual incomprehension and can be taken as a 
privileged starting point for anthropological analysis, rather than as a problem, 
which has its solution in an analysis that resolves the misunderstanding. 
To get a sense of the difference in play we turn to an example given by 
Viveiros de Castro (2009). In the example, a Piro woman responds to a mission 
schoolteacher who tried to convince her to boil water before giving it to her young 
child. The woman refused on the grounds that boiled water gave her child diarrhea. 
The teacher argued that in fact diarrhea was a result of not boiling the water. The 
clinching argument of the woman was “perhaps for people from Lima this is true. 
But for us native people from here, boiled water gives us diarrhea. Our bodies are 
different from your bodies” (Viveiros de Castro 2009: 243–4).  
Multinaturalism is evinced in this example by taking the woman’s 
explanation seriously: it is not culture that is different, or knowledge of the 
properties of water and children; it is nature that is different, the bodies of water 
and children. Viveiros de Castro connects this example with Evans-Pritchard’s 
description of a Zande man who noted matter-of-factly that: “perhaps in their 
country people are not murdered by witches, but here they are” (1937: 540). For 
the anthropologist boiled water cannot give diarrhea, witches cannot murder. For 
Piro and Azande, they can (and do). In Denmark, ghosts of dead soldiers cannot 
roam the countryside, in Vietnam they do (Kwon 2008). 
No account of the heterogeneous material practices through which water is 
boiled will allow the empirical philosopher to elucidate the ontological basis for 
these assertions. They are strictly embedded in the “perspectives” of the people 
that speak them. It is precisely the elucidation of the internal relations and 
coherences of such assertions that make up the project of multinaturalism:  
[G]iven that witches [for example] ‘cannot’ exist (as we conceive the 
notions of possibility and existence), how can the anthropologist take 
seriously the conceptions of the Azande concerning the existence of 
witches? How can the anthropologist reconceive—in other words, 
reconceptualize—witches so that they can assume a possible mode of 
existence—in other words, an interest for us? (Viveiros de Castro 2011) 
It may be said that we are then brought right back to the emic issue of insider 
perspectives, which empirical philosophy took us away from. Yet perspective is a 
somewhat imprecise term with which to characterize the views of the Piro woman 
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and Zande man. For as the former made clear, the issue is not one of cognitive 
beliefs and viewpoints but one of bodily differences. And thus we are brought 
back to the issue of comparing comparisons, for we cannot assume the norms of 
Western humanity and sociality in these cases. Directed back at people studying 
in the “generic West”, this raises the question of whether we can assume these 
entities, even “at home” (cf. Jensen 2011).  
This question is something about which Viveiros de Castro has had little to 
say, although one of his main intellectual discussion partners, M. Strathern, has. 
Her way of going about can be roughly characterized as bringing concepts 
originally developed in response to Melanesian ethnography to bear on the 
“indigenous West”. This allows for a further comparison: how does empirical 
philosophy (at home but increasingly moving elsewhere) contrast with 
multinatural anthropology brought “back home”? 
Fourth Variation: Comparing Scales and Actors 
From the preceding sections it may sound as if empirical philosophy and 
anthropological multinaturalism have developed in parallel, with little mutual 
recognition or knowledge of shared interest. Of course, this is not quite so. The 
original formulations did indeed emerge separately, in response to specific 
concerns and intellectual trajectories in fields such as science and technology 
studies, the philosophy of technology, medical sociology, and anthropology, 
especially some of its Amerindian and Melanesian variants. 
On the one hand, empirical philosophy and ANT were in conversation 
from early on with anthropological conceptions of agency and material culture. 
Later and more formative connections came about as a result of engagement with 
the also emerging sub-fields of anthropology of science, and were inspired in 
particular by M. Strathern and her colleagues’ work on the relations between new 
reproductive technologies and kinship, and on audit and evaluation cultures. On 
the other hand, anthropologists such as Strathern and Viveiros de Castro were also 
instrumental in bringing ANT inspired concepts and approaches to bear on 
ethnographic concerns that seemed to fall outside the scope of science and 
technology. There is thus increasing traffic between these “areas”, and analytical 
mixtures continue to proliferate. Indeed, concepts and modes of analysis currently 
move in multiple directions. 
There are good reasons for this, since the STS and anthropological 
approaches I have discussed indeed share affinities and inclinations. Indeed, it is 
precisely because of these obvious affinities that I engage in the present endeavor 
to differentiate. I continue by pointing to a set of contrasts relating, first, to the 
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scales of analysis adopted by empirical philosophy and multinatural anthropology, 
and, second, to the role of nonhuman (or un-, or in-human) actors. 
The starting point of ANT, as well as of empirical philosophy, is that the 
analyst does not know what the scale of a phenomenon is. It is traced in practice; 
thus the ontological contours of practice and technology are delineated, as in 
Mol’s (2002) studies of Dutch atherosclerosis, Law’s studies of English aircraft 
(2002), Latour’s studies of French trains (1996). What a human is in relation to 
these practices varies, as do the forms of sociality they embody. This starting 
point has obvious affinities with multinatural anthropology, which also abstains 
from inflicting, on Amerindian or Melanesian people, standard Western 
conceptions of what they are and do. What are the contrasts, then? Most centrally, 
I think, the question of what goes into an analytical object varies. For what is 
common to the nonhumanist literature dealing in empirical philosophy is that the 
scale of analysis is a more-or-less delineated practice. This is not the case for 
multinatural anthropology. To be sure, Melanesians engage in practices, but the 
primary emphasis is not on their material enactment of those practices. It is rather 
on the patterned ways of knowing and living of these people. 
The difference is clear when one considers modes of description. Viveiros 
de Castro, for example, moves from shamanic rituals to hunting practices, family 
relations and myths in a way that confounds the expectations of the STS-trained 
ethnographer. Likewise, Strathern’s broad-ranging characterization of English 
kinship may startle, because of its apparently unqualified analytical jumps from 
one practice to another. The jumps are of course not random (and therefore not 
jumps either). The startling effect is a consequence of quite different shifts in 
scale than those that are the métier of the empirical philosopher. And the reason is 
that the assumed scale of analysis is precisely not practice. But if is not practice, 
neither is it society nor culture. Rather, it is the ontologies of indigenous people. 
But ontology, again, operates differently here than in empirical philosophy. If, in 
empirical philosophy, the thoughts and knowledges of studied people are, in a 
sense, secondary or derivative of materially enacted practical ontologies, this 
claim is absurd for the multinatural anthropologist. For him or her, ontologies are 
rather the patterned sets of concepts held by these people, and these can be traced 
across a very broad set of cultural arenas as exemplified by M. Strathern’s study 
of English kinship (1992). 
As embodied concepts, the elucidation of indigenous ontology always 
requires description of how people act with nonhuman others. But how to get at 
such nonhuman others? Again, the immediate similarities between empirical 
philosophy and multinatural anthropology are striking. For Mol, Latour (and 
many others, including myself), the concern has been resolutely etic in the sense 
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that we have carefully followed and described all the people and things that make 
a practice work. For example, Mol talks of scalpels, walking sticks, beds, 
operating theatres. It is of little concern whether a doctor or nurse, if asked for 
verbal clarification, ascribes agency to an operating theatre what is central is to 
depict how materiality shapes ontology in practice. Now, Viveiros de Castro’s 
actors likewise include nonhuman actors such as tapirs, jaguars, and the dead. In 
neither case is the human capable of acting alone—if we are not in a posthuman 
universe, we are at least in an amodern, or nonhumanist one. However, the etic 
and the emic are once again juxtaposed and blended differently in the ‘symmetric’ 
solutions adopted by these approaches. 
Jaguars, for example, are prominent actors in Viveiros de Castro’s outline 
of Amerindian ontology. According to Amerindians, jaguars, as other entities, see 
themselves as humans. They know this, among other reasons, because shamans 
can turn themselves into jaguars under certain conditions. Jaguars see themselves 
as humans, but because they are jaguars (and have different bodies) they see 
different things. Consequently, what humans see as blood, jaguars see as manioc 
beer. This is a basic figure in Amerindian ontology as outlined by Viveiros de 
Castro and T. S. Lima. But it is one foreign to empirical philosophy, since it is 
interested in materialized engagements between jaguars and people only to a 
limited extent (and how to trace the material enactment of nocturnal 
transformations of a shaman into a jaguar?). 
The contrast can be articulated as a mutual criticism. On the one hand, the 
empirical philosopher might be tempted to argue that the way of parsing ontology 
preferred by the multinatural anthropologist reintroduces precisely the emic and 
human-centered bias that empirical philosophy has struggled to get rid of. For, 
although there are plenty of nonhuman actors, they are all seen through 
indigenous human classification systems. Where, then, is the jaguar acting in its 
own right? But then, the multinatural anthropologist might reply, who are we to 
tell how the jaguar acts as jaguar? Is a jaguar bound to behave as Westerners think 
of them, inspired by viewing too much Animal Planet? Is this not the very point at 
which the basic assumptions of Euro-American ontology reappear in ANT and 
empirical philosophy? Perhaps it is impossible to deal with the question of what is 
a practice (and what is social), and what is an actor (and human), without taking 
into considerations the ontological presuppositions one brings to bear on analysis. 
Perhaps, as well, this is something that becomes increasingly apparent to the STS 
researcher when he or she moves further away to places increasingly and unlikely 
to share basic ontological commitments (cf. Verran 1998). 
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Fifth Variation: Perspectives and Perspectivism 
These differences between empirical philosophy and multinatural anthropology 
are exhibited, their differences and stakes interestingly magnified in a recent 
discussion between A. Mol and M. Strathern, which also foregrounds the broader 
issue of humanity and sociality. 
As we have seen, Mol and her colleagues in STS have been developing 
analyses of ontological multiplicity. To be sure this has entailed criticism of the 
emic anthropological tendency to focus on and, indeed, advocate multiple points 
of view. Yet Mol’s main adversaries were never anthropologists. In the first 
instance, empirical philosophy was an effort to get around the dichotomous 
alternative of scientific naturalism and social constructivism. The perspectives 
that trouble Mol are the innumerable theoretical perspectives that can be taken on 
any phenomena. Her solution was to pay much closer attention to materiality and 
how it is dealt with in practice. 
Now, in the paper “Binary License”, Strathern (2011) addresses the issue 
of how a “comparative relativism” (Jensen 2011) inflects anthropological 
analytical practice, and makes reference precisely to the distinction between 
Amerindian perspectivism (à la Viveiros de Castro) and Western perspectivalism 
(as criticized by Mol). Strathern suggests, however, that studies focusing on 
ontological multiplicity do not break radically with perspectivalism, but operate 
from within the same overall perspectival horizon. “Multiplicity” she argues, is 
simply “perspectivalism’s critique of itself” (Strathern 2011).  
Whereas STS analysts would be inclined to see Strathernian perspectivism 
and Mol’s multiplicity as sharing an analytical motive—in contrast with Western 
perspectivalism, Strathern offers a quite different classification. Indeed, she 
suggests that “it goes without saying that perspectivalism and its critique is the 
antonym of perspectivism”. It offers, as she puts it, a “different mathematics 
altogether”. The etic–emic is blended differently; once again, we are in the realm 
of mutually different (mis-)understandings. 
In response to Strathern’s paper, Mol picks up precisely on Strathern’s 
classification, of both multiplicity and perspectivalism, as antonyms of 
perspectivism. She comments on the implied binary: “Here one world, many 
viewpoints, there one viewpoint, many worlds. Multiculturalism versus 
multinaturalism: the binary is stunningly clarifying and movingly beautiful” (Mol 
2011). But, Mol asks, where to go with that observation of categorical difference? 
Mol continues by questioning Strathern’s strategy of stressing difference (between 
empirical philosophy and multinatural anthropology but also, by implication, 
between the people and things addressed via them). For Mol, the question that 
must be addressed is one of learning: 
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Is being different all we can do? There is so much to learn. For instance, 
if the Hagen have no nature and no culture, then why, just because I 
have been born in the Netherlands, should I? (Mol 2011) 
The issue of politics surfaces here as well because Mol uses this rhetorical 
question to query whom we hope will be capable of drawing insight or actions 
from these analyses. Is the primary aim to elucidate Hageners’ (local, social) 
ontological configurations? Or, is it to provide tools for thinking about other 
human and social configurations, elsewhere? Indeed, is this choice exclusive? 
Mol’s stance is that it is not, proposing that analyses should facilitate learning 
from “site and situations elsewhere, not just about elsewhere, but also for ‘us’”. 
In making this argument, Mol considers Strathern’s analysis to be overly 
preoccupied with questions relating to knowledge (how we, from here, can get 
understand people elsewhere). These are, of course, classical emic concerns of 
anthropology. But rather than remaining at the level of comparing and contrasting 
“conceptual configurations” only in order to find how knowledge differs, Mol 
reiterates the argument that we may stick closer to the level of materiality—
comparing, for example “not conceptual schemes but practices of cutting” into the 
bodies of patients. 
Thus, transporting the analytical focus back to terrain of practical ontology 
we may observe how, in theory, different worldviews (à la Strathern and Viveiros 
de Castro) may be in play but, in practice, different knowledge can co-exist, even 
where there is no shared conceptual grounding. 
Mol ends her response with two questions. Having learned from Strathern’s 
Melanesian work how to be differently interested in “the hospital around the corner”, 
she wonders whether, given Strathern’s argument’s ontological alterity, this 
analytical transportation is a “permissible move”. “Is it ok”, Mol asks, “once we 
have been taught how to recognize them, to ‘find them diffracted” in other times 
and places (2011). A second urgent question follows. With the ambition to read 
ethnographies for how they might help change “who ‘we’ are, or, for that matter 
what we do”, Mol brings us back to an Amazonian example. While Amazonians 
may “conceptualize all relations in metabolic terms”, Mol notes: the rest of us, even 
if we talk knowledge and eyes, are, in practice, eaters, too”. Most of us—Western 
and Japanese—relate to “most of the world as prey. By far the largest part of the 
global biomass is currently grown or raised for humans to feed on”. Food and 
fighting interrelate, increasingly and globally. Humanity and sociality, both locally 
and globally, may be reconfigured through food. The activist end point of Mol’s 
comment is to ask: “in which vocabulary to write about that”. The issue relates to 
the practical consequences of conceptual work. 
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Sixth Variation: Matters of Consequences 
This raises the issue of whether specific questions of practical consequences (in 
plural) can be separated from questions of what, for lack of neutral word, we may 
call questions of conceptualization? To address this general question of analytical 
consequence (in the singular), I trace the exchange between Mol and Strathern to 
its end (asymmetrically, since Strathern had the last word!). 
In response to Mol, Strathern qualifies the stark binary she initially offered 
between empirical philosophy and multinatural anthropology: “while a 
perspectivalist viewpoint cannot enact a perspectivist one, it can co-exist with the 
enactment of its critical opposite, ‘multiplicity’” (Strathern 2011a). 2  Strathern, 
however, continues to observe that the question of consequences is inseparable 
from issues of description and analysis. In the terminology used here: since the emic 
and the etic invariably blend, it requires ongoing vigilance to handle the mixture.  
Thus Strathern suggests that Mol moves too quickly to separate the 
practices from the way in which they are described, without recognizing that this 
separation is of analytical consequence. What is taken for granted: “in the 
juxtaposition of acts and practices seems to be the sense in which acts are not 
affected by how they are described” (2011a, my emphasis). The issue is that what 
comes to be defined as the practical matter of consequence is bound up with the 
way in which the matter is described. This, in turn, relates to the specification of 
what counts as consequential analytical questions. Because blending the empirical 
and the conceptual, the inside and the outside, is what occurs in description, 
Strathern continues, Mol is also able to “hold the question of description at bay 
only for so long” (2011a). 
How is that? It appears only too obvious that situations relating to global 
humanity, such as food shortages (to which Mol referred), or to local sociality, 
such as indigenous health conditions (which Viveiros de Castro touched upon), 
require urgent attention. Taking seriously Mol’s invitation to consider the material 
practices of cutting, however, Strathern invites comparison of a quite different 
order, by evoking a Melanesian scene: 
Suppose cutting people off from one another were routinised, and to be a 
man you had to shed feminine parts of yourself and discard a woman’s 
world, you might be made to wash your eyes with abrasive leaves in a 
cold mountain stream (2011a). 
                                                           
2
 It thus appears that Mol’s request for a permit to bring multinatural perspectivism thought to 
bear on “the hospital around the corner” is granted. 
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If this example seem to stretch the notion of cutting, extending it to incorporate 
(untenable) conceptualizations, Strathern argues, this is precisely “an effect of the 
English language”, in which 
[O]ne appears to be speaking much more metaphorically in the case of 
persons cutting themselves off from one another, itself a perfectly 
acceptable figure of speech in English, than in the case of the incisions 
that bloody a novice’s back (2011a). 
From a multinatural vantage point, however, the relations are nowhere as clear. 
Western understandings of what counts as material practices of cutting fail to be 
relevant to the Melanesian concerns involved in this case. In which case, as 
Strathern concludes, “it is not at all clear to me what independent force the idea of 
action or practice now holds” (2011a).  
We may compare this observation with Viveiros de Castro’s example of 
the Piro woman that insisted that boiled water gave her children diarrhea. Viveiros 
de Castro says about this example that the problem it poses is that most readers do 
not believe that Piro infants should be given unboiled water. We know that human 
beings are made of the same stuff, over and above, cultural differences. Most 
Westerners would argue that: “the Piro may deny this fact but their cultural ‘view’ 
cannot change one iota the way things are” (Viveiros de Castro 2009: 245).  
One of the resonances of empirical philosophy and multinatural 
anthropology is that both (sets of) approaches are equally keen to move away 
from such hierarchical (culturalist) explanation and towards more symmetrical 
accounts. Following Mol or Latour, we may turn to practice. As previously noted, 
however, Viveiros de Castro’s approach is rather to turn to the “ontological 
presuppositions of the Piro mother’s reply” (246). But does this not confine 
multinatural analysis to a human-centered cultural analysis? Answering in the 
negative, Viveiros de Castro, argues that the anthropologist may take as his job to 
“determine the possible world expressed” in the Piro woman’s rejection of boiled 
water. He suggests that this does not require the analyst to “contrive an imaginary 
science-fictional universe endowed with another physics and another biology”. 
Instead, it entails delineating the problem “that makes possible the world implied” 
in the woman’s answer. This problem, he ventures, has 
[N]othing to do with the quality of Santa Clara’s water supply, and 
everything to do with the relation, both bodily and political, between the 
mother, the schoolteacher, and the child (246). 
It is not obvious that this viewpoint is very far from the “activist reading” 
advocated by Mol. Learning is clearly at issue. Still, as Strathern argues:  
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[W]hile there are many ways of learning, when the learning is caught up 
in apparatuses of description, then language and the position from which 
one speaks or writes cannot be innocent (Strathen 2011a). 
Which is why Mol’s central and unresolved question: “in what vocabulary to 
write about that?” (Mol 2011) is indeed a good one. It is one that each of the 
variations have struggled with; one that determines the ways in which the human 
and the social are made available in our descriptions.  
Seventh Variation: Humanity and Sociality, Empirical and Conceptual 
In which vocabulary to write about that? (Mol 2011) 
Taken out of its specific context, Mol’s question can be made to stand for a 
generic problem: in which vocabulary to write about that—whatever is the that 
that anthropologists want to write about. Relocated in the context of the present 
occasion, the question can be specified as how to empirically and conceptually 
engage the variable parameters of the human and the social, as encountered by 
contemporary anthropologists. 
Mol’s question must continuously be asked and dealt with precisely 
because it is the kind of question that cannot receive any generally adequate 
answer. Because the that varies: as in Strathern’s (2011) discussion of encounters 
in Mt. Hagen decades ago, turns into a general discussion about how to theorize 
ethnicity, which again turns into Mol’s (2011) question about global food shortage. 
And because this variation is both empirically and built into descriptive-
conceptual packages, outsides and insides mix. For example, Strathern’s concern 
is not primarily and certainly not only to do with Hagener conflicts. It is 
simultaneously to do with the work done by the descriptive moves through which 
their activities are elicited as conflicts rather than as something quite different. 
Following some of the most interesting scholars in contemporary STS and 
anthropology, this paper has engaged in an effort of continuous variation—or 
comparative relativism (Jensen 2011), by following how in empirical philosophy 
and multinatural anthropology manipulate descriptive and conceptual “parameters” 
are manipulated in attempts to get different kinds of purchase on the human and 
the social. 
Differentiating the routes traced by these approaches, the different 
conceptual-empirical resources they bring to the task, has been central. In this light 
it is worth noting that the traps that symmetrical STS and multinatural anthropology 
struggle to avoid often seems similar. Deeply committed to a simultaneous effort of 
ethnographic exploration and conceptual articulation, the body of research I have 
dealt with is unusually attentive to the mixtures of emic and etic inquiry, the 
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creativity involved in establishing continuity between conceptual and empirical 
registers. Yet this attentiveness and creativity is regularly perceived as a weakness 
of these studies. This is the trap set by modern epistemology. 
For example: if B. Latour advocates a symmetrical anthropology, he can 
be criticized for failing to realize that most people and societies operate non-
symmetrical hierarchies and do not believe that things and people have the same 
kind of agency. Or, if E. Viveiros de Castro (2011) advocates multinatural 
anthropology with the aim to provide a “theory of people’s ontological auto-
determination”, this can be challenged with reference to his Deleuzian inspiration. 
In these and other cases the clinching argument is that the emic has 
somehow been superseded by the etic, the conceptual somehow contaminates the 
empirical. Conceptual contamination takes us away from what is real and disables 
us from engaging urgent questions. Yet, in my view, much of the excitement 
generated by these diverse and overlapping approaches arises from their ongoing 
effort to destabilize and redo these binaries. And here I should like to agree with 
A. Mol: there is so much to learn, not only from the heterogenous peoples, cases, 
and practices we study but also from the heterogenous tools, methods, and 
analytical emphases used for articulating humanity and sociality. Learning, in this 
sense, provides the impetus for engaging in the variations above. Indeed, the 
combination and mutual translation of insights from empirical philosophy and 
multinatural anthropology seems a most fruitful way forward for both STS and 
anthropological scholarship (Gad & Jensen 2010; Jensen & Gad 2008). 
As Mol insists urgent questions about humanity and sociality must be 
addressed using all empirical and conceptual means. But this can only occur in a 
situation informed by sufficient perplexity with regard to what is urgent, why, and 
for whom (incidentally, thinking back to the first variation, this can be thought of 
as a way of seeking out and learning from, rather than avoiding cognitive 
dissonance). Indeed, the scholars whose work I have taken liberties with today 
provide resources for heightening perplexity. For, according to their varied 
diagnoses, we are living in a world which, rather than consisting of one nature, 
one humanity and many societies, is populated by multiple natures in which 
humans, animals, societies, and technologies operate differently and continue to 
undergo modification. And we don’t yet know how!  
In explicating his argument about the ontological self-determination of 
people, Viveiros de Castro  argues that the central question (to which the that that 
we write about must always relate) is “where do we come from and where are we 
going?” The question is central because in Viveiros de Castro’s none too positive 
estimation: “we have to start from where we are because here is not where we 
want to be”. This, too, is an activist question. The challenge of how to “move 
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elsewhere” may indeed be seen as urgent. Given Viveiros de Castro’s lack of 
advice on where to move—and indeed why—it certainly introduces perplexity. 
Yet, perhaps introducing perplexity is precisely the kind of activism suited for 
anthropology and STS. In a political and academic climate characterized by the 
propagation of so many common and un-perplexed notions about humans and 
their social relations, perhaps it can even be seen as a radical—uncommon and 
perplexed—activism.  
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